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Abstract
The emphasis on ‘indigenous science’ is a recent phenomenon in higher education as 
elsewhere. There are several projects that underlie this idea: publicisation of the victimi-
sation and exploitation of the areas of practice and research constituting ‘ethnoscience’, 
acknowledgement of their autonomy, and their inclusion in tertiary educational cur-
ricula. Appeals to indigenous scientific knowledge systems and indigenous knowledge 
production, therefore, have reclamation as their central focus. This article attempts to 
cast doubt on the plausibility of this enterprise. For anything to be called ‘science’, it 
necessarily involves reference to laws or regularities, observation, description, expla-
nation, prediction and testable hypothesis. While practices, skills and beliefs, and the 
ascription or attribution of scientific knowledge may vary according to personal, social 
or cultural context, scientific knowledge and truth as such do not so vary as such. It is 
this insight, and not adherence to a questionable idea, that has profound implications 
for higher education and tertiary curricula.
COSMIC AFRICA
The film Cosmic Africa, by South African brothers Craig and Damon Foster and 
concept originator and key researcher Anne Rogers, documents the journey of South 
African astrophysicist Thebe Medupe. His mission is to connect occidental science 
and astronomy to the cosmological models of some of the oldest civilisations on 
earth. ‘Astronomy’ survives in these ancient societies despite the eroding effects of 
colonialism and its modern heir, globalisation. Medupe emphasises that ‘astronomy’ 
has never just been a science in these cultures. For them, it is an ‘intimate tapestry 
merging into their prayers, their lives, their dreams and their deaths’. Occidental 
culture, on the other hand, has separated astronomy from daily experience and turned 
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it into ‘pure science’. Medupe’s mission is stated at the very beginning of the film: 
‘I need to discover whether my science has a place in Africa, and whether Africa 
has a place in my science’. His journey leads him to the Ju/’hoansi in northeastern 
Namibia, the Dogon in Mali and finally to Nabta Playa in the southern Egyptian 
Sahara, to what is conceivably the site of the first solar observatory (see also Rogers 
2007, 19).
During his visit to Namibia, Medupe learns not only of Ju/’hoansi reliance on the 
stars as to when to plant and to harvest but many of the stories connected to the sun, 
moon and stars: 
One memorable night, Kxau Tami and /Kunta Boo, two elderly shamans demonstrated 
how they would throw burning sticks in the direction of a very bright meteor – as 
they threw the sticks into the air, they uttered swear and curse words which they said 
would help to divert the meteor’s path and thereby prevent its dangerous potential. 
They believe that bright shooting stars with fiery tails are invested with very powerful 
!nom (extreme potency) and that they have the potential to cause sickness. (Rogers 
2007, 21).
Medupe’s visit to the Ju/’hoansi coincides with a total solar eclipse. He worries about 
whether he should tell the people about what is going to happen but decides not to: 
they would want to know how he knows. Instead, he sets up his equipment. When 
the eclipse happens, people talk about the return of winter and blame the intruder and 
his equipment: ‘The telescope is eating up the sun’. After the eclipse and subsequent 
reconciliation, Medupe says, ‘For the first time I see how the stars affect the way 
people live. My science and my Africa are beginning to come together.’ 
This impression is deepened with the visit to the Dogon, whose knowledge of 
the stars is legendary. Their daily and seasonal activities, routines and customs are 
guided, for example, by the appearance of what we call Venus (for which the Dogon 
have ‘a number of different names … , depending on its station in the sky’; (Rog-
ers 2007, 21)), ‘Toro Jugo’ (the Pleaides; Rogers 2007, 20), etc. One of the elders, 
spiritual leader Annayé Doumbo, claims, ‘In our Dogon way, the man who makes 
technology is the sorcerer of the sun’. Given the harsh conditions under which they 
live, to the Dogon knowing the stars can mean the difference between life and death. 
Does the elder know that human beings have walked on the moon? ‘There is no gate 
to the moon’, is the reply, ‘It is not possible for anyone to go there, unless they are 
the little brother of God.’ 
The last leg of Medupe’s journey is what is presented as the origin of astronomy, 
Egypt. (There is no mention of the innovations and discoveries of the Maya and 
Aztecs.) In the southern Egyptian desert, near the border of Sudan, he discovers what 
is conceivably the oldest observatory, conceived and constructed by the Nabtans, 
nomadic pastoralists, now long dead. Predating Stonehenge in England by almost 
1000 years, it consists of countless stones emanating from a centre, in order to trace 
the rising and setting of the sun during the year, as well as the passage of the moon 
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and stars (Rogers 2007, 23): ‘The origin of astronomy, its measuring and predicting, 
is in Africa … Stones took the place that my computer takes now’.
It is unfortunate that, throughout the film, Medupe and the research team never 
explore any of the tensions between traditional, indigenous and scientific world-
views. They seem satisfied with just noting the different perceptions and appear to 
assume that there is no problem of reconciliation of myth or legend with scientific 
fact. At the end of the film, Medupe states that he has come ‘full circle’, that his 
journey has served to (re)unite ‘his science’ and ‘his Africa’, without so much as an 
attempt to account for the contradictions he has encountered between spirituality and 
astronomy. 
One of Medupe’s intentions is to create an African star chart. His long-term goal 
is to develop a database and to set up a formal ethnoastronomy research group. The 
pertinent questions, for present purposes, are: Does the idea of ‘ethnoastronomy’ 
make sense? What, if anything, distinguishes ‘ethnoscience’ from mainstream, 
academic science? Is it a spiritual, contextual, subjective or personal element? One 
response, emphasising the local and contextual character of scientific knowledge and 
truth, is the argument from social construction. Two related ideas in this regard are 
those of ‘situated cognition’ and ‘personal knowledge’. I will briefly examine each 
of these in turn. 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION, ‘SITUATED COGNITION’ AND 
‘PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE’
According to the National Curriculum Statement for the Natural Sciences, Specific 
Outcome 7, learners are expected to demonstrate an understanding of ‘changing and 
contested nature of knowledge in the Natural Sciences’. It encourages learners to 
view scientific knowledge as ‘socially constructed and subject to change and differ-
ent interpretations’ (Department of Education 1997; see also Dempster and Hugo 
2005). In the Revised National Curriculum Statement for the Natural Sciences it is 
pointed out that biological differences among different ethnic groups do not indicate 
different innate capacities among these groups: 
Variations in human biological characteristics such as skin colour, height, and so 
on, have been used to categorize groups of people. These biological differences do 
not indicate differences in innate abilities of the groups concerned. Therefore, such 
categorisation of groups by biological differences is neither scientifically valid nor 
exact. It is a social construct. (Department of Education 2002, 64; see also Dempster 
and Hugo 2005).
This argument is plausible. Interestingly, it contrapositions scientific validity and 
exactness, on the one hand, and social construction, on the other. Yet, if science itself 
is ‘social construct’, then this clearly weakens the scientific case against race- and 
sex-based categorisation and biological differences. Scientific knowledge of the so-
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cially constructed nature of classification and differentiation would itself be a social 
construct.
The ‘social constructivist’ position, I think, has more to do with beliefs than with 
knowledge and truth. Perhaps critical realism shares with constructivism the view 
that, without ‘God’s eye-view’, objective reality and truth as such are impossible to 
access in toto. Yet, the former position maintains not only that one can get closer to 
such reality and truth (that is, by learning to avoid error) but to gain partial access 
– without in any ontologically significant way being the ‘maker’ of that reality and 
truth. The virtue of this position is that it does not make any logically and epistemo-
logically dubious inferences along the lines of the latter. Finally, unlike constructiv-
ists, critical realists arguably practice what they preach.
Olugbemiro Jegede characterises ‘situated cognition’ as a ‘strong relationship that 
exists between the prior knowledge and sociocultural environment’ of the student. It 
is ‘deemed primitive, inferior, and unscientific’ by/ in the ‘Western view, especially 
with regard to science teaching and learning’ (Jegede 1999, 120, 123). No won-
der, the cynic might think: the four fundamental features of the African belief and 
thought system enumerated by Jegede – belief in a creator/God, belief in life after 
death/ reincarnation, anthropocentrism or the idea that human beings constitute the 
centre of the universe, and the theory of causality, which ‘is the sociocultural cloak 
the African child takes to the science classrooms’ (Jegede 1999, 125) – have little to 
do with knowledge, cognition or science. In addition, Jegede’s position gives rise to 
a logical problem. Who is the ‘situated cogniser’ making these claims and construct-
ing these meanings, then? 
In a similar vein, Lesley le Grange mentions the ‘localness’ of all knowledge 
systems: all knowledge is local, ‘located/ situated and motley (messy situatedness)’ 
(Le Grange 2004b, 87). I would suggest here that, while it makes some sense to say 
that ‘all knowledge systems have localness in common’ (Le Grange 2004b, 87), 
they also share objectivity and translocalness. Le Grange would probably concur 
with C. Shiv Visvanathan: ‘Morality, like science, has to be invented individually’ 
(Visvanathan 2002, 51). This view indicates a basic misconception. In fact, neither 
science nor morality is an individual invention. The individual is initiated into both 
and perhaps attains autonomy in one or both of these realms later. There is also a 
disconcerting relativism manifest in views like these, a problem I will elaborate on 
later. Some writers who favour an account of ‘personal knowledge’, like Michael 
Polanyi and Karori Mbugua, are aware of this problem. Nevertheless, according 
to Mbugua, Polanyi’s ‘personal knowledge’ seeks to avoid relativism because of 
knower’s commitment to universality (Mbugua 1998, 155; Polanyi 1958, 316). I 
suggest that this salvages the idea only if Polanyi and Mbugua (as ‘knowers’ and as 
‘makers of knowledge claims’) share this commitment. 
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‘WE SEE NATURE DIFFERENTLY AND SPEAK TO AND ABOUT IT 
DIFFERENTLY’
According to Zimbabwean novelist Chenjerai Hove,
We have neither catalogued nature nor pinned it down and preserved it in formalde-
hyde. We see it differently and speak to and about it differently. (Grill 2003, 363).
Hove is arguably correct about one thing. Practices like large-scale dissection, vivi-
section and, generally, all scientific experimentation involving nonhuman animals 
appear to have been pioneered and exported all over the globe by monetarily inclined 
‘westerners’. The same goes for the so-called ‘scientific’ factory farming and mass 
slaughter of food animals. Of course, this subjugationist and expansionist mindset 
and drive claimed countless human victims, too – which may explain the accusations 
made by or on behalf of indigenous people, Africans, native Americans and Austra-
lian aboriginal people, accusations like Hove’s. But is Hove correct when he claims, 
‘We see [nature] differently and speak to and about it differently’?
Hove’s view is shared by many writers and theorists. Ladislaus Semali and Joe 
Kincheloe refer to the 
use of indigenous knowledge to counter Western science’s destruction of the earth. 
Indigenous knowledge can facilitate this ambitious project because of its tendency to 
focus on relationships of humans to both one another and to their ecosystem. (Semali 
and Kincheloe 1999, 16).
Le Grange concurs:
(South) Africa has to use the good of Western science and also recognize its negative 
side that has destroyed natural environments and denigrated the cultures of African 
people. Invoking the term indigenous knowledge can engage Western science de-
constructively so as to overcome the binary opposition between Western science and 
indigenous knowledge. (Le Grange 2004b, 88).
Yet, not all authors share the idea of a possible synthesis. Madhu Suri Prakash, after 
mentioning the claim to universality and objectivity of modern science and its propa-
gators (Prakash 1999, 157, 158), states that, given ‘cultural and ecological damage 
being perpetrated by [modern science] on a global scale, critics have postulated the 
existence of two distinct and incompatible types of science or knowledge systems’ 
(Prakash 1999, 160). He refers to the incommensurability and fundamental differ-
ence between modern scientific and other knowledge systems (Prakash 1999, 167, 
168). It should be clear that, on this characterisation, there is no basis for comparing 
and evaluating different types of science and knowledge systems.
In terms of such a contrast, Catherine Odora Hoppers refers to traditional knowl-
edge as 
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the totality of all knowledges and practices … used in the management of socio-
economic, spiritual and ecological facets of life. In this sense it can be contrasted with 
‘cosmopolitan knowledge’ that is culturally anchored in Western cosmology, scientific 
discoveries, economic preferences and philosophies. (Odora Hoppers 2005, 3).
She continues:
The relationship between people, the knowledge and the technologies for its applica-
tion are under-girded by a cosmology, a world view. … Relationships between people 
hold pride of place, expressed in the various philosophies across Africa, and best 
captured by the African concept of Ubuntu … In the context of such a philosophy, 
IKS [indigenous knowledge systems] practice does not seek to conquer or debilitate 
nature as a first impulse. This can be contrasted, for instance, with … the mechanis-
tic conception of reality … IKS stresses instead the essential interrelatedness and 
interdependence of all phenomena – biological, physical, psychological, social and 
cultural. Indigenous cosmology centres on the co-evolution of the spiritual, natural 
and human worlds. … Experiences from indigenous communities in other parts of 
the world emphasize the fact that knowledge is relationship, and relationship brings 
with it responsibilities and obligations and extends into ecological practice. (Odora 
Hoppers 2005, 4–6).
Given that ubuntu is essentially and explicitly anthropocentric, the difference be-
tween African knowledge systems and the ‘Western’, ‘mechanistic’, subjugationist 
conception of nature and reality is not radical but one of degree, not qualitative 
but quantitative. One is left to wonder whether, given comparable economic and 
military powers, so-called ‘IKS practice’ would not have led to a similar kind and 
extent of abuse and exploitation, in the name and for the sake of ‘human solidarity’ 
(Odora Hoppers 2005, 4). But what, exactly, is ‘indigenous knowledge’, in particular 
indigenous scientific knowledge, and what is the invocation of ‘indigenous science’ 
meant to accomplish? 
THE IDEA OF ‘INDIGENOUS SCIENCE’
The emphasis on ‘indigenous science’ is a fairly recent phenomenon, in higher 
education as elsewhere. Indigenous science is usually taken to cover indigenous 
astronomy, indigenous physics, ‘ethnomedicine’, ‘ethnobotany’, ‘ethnozoology’, 
as well as ‘ethnopsychiatry’. There are several projects that appear to underlie this 
idea. First, publicisation of the suppression and exploitation of the areas of practice 
and research constituting ‘ethnoscience’: indigenous science or ‘ethnoscience’ has 
traditionally and historically been victimised, marginalised or exploited for the sake 
of colonialist promotion of occidental science. Second, acknowledgement of their 
autonomy: the fields grouped together under the term ‘indigenous science’ constitute 
or describe culturally specific and independent areas of practice and research. Third, 
their inclusion in tertiary educational curricula: insofar as these fields constitute 
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‘valid’ or ‘legitimate’ knowledge, the debate around indigenous scientific knowledge 
production has direct bearing on and should enter higher education. Indeed, they 
should be granted equal time and space alongside mainstream or academic science 
in tertiary educational curricula. Emphasis of indigenous scientific knowledge sys-
tems and indigenous knowledge production, therefore, has as its central focus that 
of reclamation. 
Odora Hoppers states that ‘the notion of indigenous knowledge systems (IKS) has 
been defined as the sum total of all knowledge and skills which people in a particular 
geographic area possess, and which enables them to get the most out of their natural 
environment’ (Odora Hoppers 2005, 2). ‘Categories of these traditional knowledges 
include agricultural, meteorological, ecological, … medicinal and pharmaceutical, 
… textile manufacture, metallurgy and food technology’ (Odora Hoppers 2005, 3). 
Having provided Odora Hoppers with several of these categories, Ivan van Sertima 
(van Sertima 1999) and Sipho Seepe (Seepe 2000) emphasize the autonomy and 
cultural specificity of indigenous science, as does Odora Hoppers herself (Odora 
Hoppers 2002b, 14, 18; see also Visvanathan 2002, 49; Jegede 1999, 130, 131; Le 
Grange 2004a, on the ‘cultural situatedness’ and ‘socially constructed nature’ of 
science). Nonetheless, apart from ‘knowledge’ and ‘science’ remaining undefined, 
some knowledge systems appear to be more indigenous than others. If Africanist 
scholars are correct in their assertions that Africa is the cradle of humankind and 
the locus of the first great civilisations from which all others derive, as well as the 
birthplace of technology, metallurgy, astronomy, mathematics, agricultural science 
and medicine (van Sertima 1999; Seepe 2000), then all other ‘knowledges’ emanate 
from Africa and are ‘indigenous’ only in a derivative sense.
These kinds of assertions also lend a new, interesting dimension to the consid-
eration that indigenous science has been, and continues to be, both suppressed and 
exploited in the process of colonisation (Odora Hoppers 2002a, vii; Grill 2003, 46, 
47, 95, 96). Bernhard Dernburg, the first German colonial minister, provided a frank 
definition of the enterprise of colonial expansion: ‘Colonisation is the harnessing of 
the soil, its natural resources, flora, fauna and especially of the people, all for the sake 
of the economy of the colonizing nation, which in turn is obliged to make a return 
gift of its higher culture, its moral concepts and its superior methods’ (quoted in Grill 
2003, 79). One could also express this more bluntly: subjugation, exploitation and 
re-education that, on the Africanist analysis, constitute violation of the ‘birth-giver’, 
if not a form of ‘matricide’. 
The inclusion in tertiary educational curricula of indigenous scientific knowledge 
systems and indigenous knowledge production and the ideas of reclamation and 
transformation are intimately linked. Thus Semali and Kincheloe:
Our notion of an indigenously-informed transformative science is not one that 
simply admits more peoples … into the country club of science but challenges the 
epistemological foundations of the ethnoknowledge known simply as science. … A 
transformative science of education, for example, takes these epistemological and 
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cultural dynamics into account as it reconceptualizes the way students are tradition-
ally assessed. Rejecting the tendency of modernist educators to judge students on an 
arbitrary, allegedly neutral standard unconnected to them, the transformative educator 
develops personalized means of evaluating an individual’s performance. . . . [Trans-
formative analysts] are rejecting the universalisation tendency of modernist science, 
interrogating the power dynamics and cultural assumptions inscribed upon so-called 
universal propositions. In this manner they are valuing locality and the insights the 
process of “de-universalisation” can provide. (Semali and Kincheloe 1999, 45, 46; 
see also Le Grange 2004a; Le Grange 2004b, 88–90; Odora Hoppers 2005, 13–16, 
28–34).
Before I go on to interrogate the notions of ethnoscience and of indigenous scientific 
knowledge, I want to state that in principle I sympathise greatly with the concerns that 
underlie advocacy of indigenous science projects. For one thing, occidental knowledge, 
science, technology and ‘rationality’ have led to, or have had as a significant goal, 
the subjugation of nature, and so far have been devastatingly efficient. The pursuit of 
nuclear energy (see Fig 2005), wholesale deforestation and the destruction of flora and 
fauna are arguably deplorable and – indeed – irrational. Similarly, apart from being 
ethically suspect, factory farming of nonhuman animals for human consumption and, 
especially, vivisection are also examples of bad science (see Horsthemke 1993, chap-
ter 3). For another, the disparagement and belittling of indigenous peoples’ practices, 
skills and insights has, to a large extent, been arrogant and of similarly questionable 
rationality. Finally, current attempts by industrial, first-world nations to (re)colonise or 
appropriate for commercial gain these practices, skills and insights (all in the name of 
globalisation) are exploitative and contemptible.
Having said this, however, I consider blanket appeals to the concept of indigenous 
science, and its ‘legitimisation’ or ‘validation’, as a remedy or countermeasure to be 
completely misguided. Any such appeal is inadequate, not least because of a general 
lack of appreciation of the semantic and logical problems involved in employing and 
applying the concept of ‘scientific knowledge’ beyond the sense of practice or skill, 
while still referring to the knowledge in question as ‘indigenous’ and – as such – as 
‘fundamentally different’, ‘unique’ and ‘incommensurable’ or ‘incompatible’ with 
‘mainstream’ science. As indicated earlier, there is almost a complete absence of 
definition, even of working definitions, of the crucial ideas of ‘knowledge’ and ‘sci-
ence’ in the various accounts that have been presented over the years. Le Grange’s is 
no exception, appearances notwithstanding, like when he claims that
recognizing that all knowledges have localness in common decentres Western science 
and serves [as] a basis for comparing different knowledges equitably. (Le Grange 
2004b, 88; amendment mine).
Shared ‘localness’ and ‘messy situatedness’, I submit, are not enough to render pos-
sible comparison, let alone an indication as to how ‘Western science’ and ‘indigenous 
knowledge’ can ‘work together’. In what follows, I will attempt to indicate what a 
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requisite understanding essentially involves. This will serve not only as conceptual 
clarification but also as the basis for my misgivings about indigenous ‘science’.
MY PROJECT
I argue in this article that ‘ethnoscience’ and ‘indigenous scientific knowledge’ have 
limited plausibility. As I see it, the dilemma for the ‘indigenous science’ apologist 
is the following. Insofar as the term ‘indigenous’ makes sense, it is not a matter of 
scientific ‘knowledge’, strictly speaking, but rather of ‘indigenous scientific skills/ 
practices’ or of ‘indigenous beliefs’. Insofar as the terms ‘science’ and ‘knowledge’ 
are plausible in this context, in the sense of involving reference to truth and scientific 
evidence, this is not a matter of being ‘indigenous’, ‘local’, and so forth. It is a matter 
of ‘science’ and ‘knowledge’ per se.
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE ROLE OF THE UNIVERSITY
In this section, I attempt to cast doubt on the plausibility of the ‘ethnoscience’ or 
‘indigenous scientific knowledge’ project. If anything qualifies as science, there are 
certain criteria that must hold. For anything to be called ‘science’, it necessarily 
involves reference to laws or regularities, observation, description, explanation, pre-
diction and testable hypothesis. If it does not meet these criteria, it is not ‘science’, 
strictly speaking. 
With regard to scientific knowledge, one generally distinguishes between two 
kinds: practical knowledge and theoretical knowledge. The former denotes skill or 
ability, frequently also a practice or custom taught or passed down from one genera-
tion to another. Apart from necessarily incorporating belief, the latter kind of knowl-
edge involves commitment to truth and scientific evidence. In other words, a person 
knows that something is the case if she believes that it is; it is so (or it is true that it 
is the case); and she has adequate evidence for believing that it is. ‘Adequacy’, here, 
is determined by the kind, degree, as well as the context of evidence. Different kinds 
of evidence pertain to the different sciences, natural as well as social. They include 
observation, sense experience, oral and written testimony, deductive and inductive 
reasoning, and so on. As far as the requisite degree is concerned: minimal evidence 
is clearly not enough, while conclusive evidence is usually not available. Normally, 
that is, other than in mathematics and deductive logic, we accept evidence that is less 
than conclusive, that is, reasons that are nonetheless compelling. 
Yet, what makes evidential reasons compelling has partly, and importantly, to do 
with context – not only the particular scientific context but also, for example, the 
environment, the cultural and social biography, and/ or the reasoning level of the 
person making a knowledge claim. Considerations of context determine leniency 
or stringency in ascription of scientific knowledge. Thus, we are generally more 
lenient in attributing knowledge (and, therefore, sufficient evidence) to a younger 
person, as opposed to an older, more mature and experienced person. Similarly, we 
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are considerably stricter (that is, we demand more, better, or additional evidence) 
when assessing the knowledge claims of an educated urban, cosmopolitan citizen, 
than we are when dealing with a person from a remote, rural area. It is important to 
note that, in terms of this definition, while belief and what counts as evidence may 
vary from individual to individual, society to society, culture to culture, truth does 
not. Truth provides the objective anchor for knowledge, and paradigmatically for 
scientific knowledge. 
I want to focus briefly on two problems with ‘indigenous science’, in the light of 
this analysis:
the problem of superstition and • 
the problem of relativism.• 
In some instances, ‘indigenous science’ is taken to cover all kinds of beliefs, with 
little or no reference to truth or evidence. This elevates to the status of knowledge 
not only mere assumption and opinion, but also superstition (as in the case of belief 
in witchcraft, in the tokoloshe or mantindane, that sex with a virgin prevents or cures 
HIV/ AIDS, and the like), divination, soothsaying and the like. In the absence of 
any explicit mention of truth, then, the applicable idea would be that of ‘indigenous 
beliefs’. Given the philosophical definition of knowledge, belief – even belief that is 
based on evidence – does not amount to knowledge. The major problem here is that, 
in the absence of truth, emphasis on ‘indigenous science’ does not appear to render 
possible a distinction between science and non-science.
Writers often also refer to the (need for) ‘validation’ or ‘legitimisation’ of indig-
enous science, or to ‘warranted’ and ‘valid’ scientific knowledge (see Semali and 
Kincheloe 1999, 35; Odora Hoppers 2002b, 7; Odora Hoppers 2005, 24), especially 
in terms of its inclusion in tertiary educational curricula. All these references are tau-
tologies. Considering the centrality of evidence, scientific knowledge is necessarily 
valid, legitimate, warranted. There simply could be no other knowledge, knowledge 
that is invalid, illegitimate or unwarranted. It would not be knowledge then. This 
is not to deny that knowledge can be and often is subjugated. A pertinent consider-
ation here would concern the impact of the first significant astronomic discoveries 
on a flat-earth, geocentric worldview, or of the theory of evolution on an orthodox, 
theocentric mindset, and the subsequent suppression of these views. But here the 
emphasis has changed, subtly, to incorporate truth. (It should be noted that reference 
to ‘true knowledge’, too, involves a tautology.) 
In other instances, reference to truth is explicit, the underlying assumption being 
that there are multitudinous truths, that with a multiplicity of indigenous cultures 
and subcultures there exists a multiplicity of truths, none of which are superior to 
any other (see Semali and Kincheloe 1999, 27, 28; Odora Hoppers 2002b, 14; Odora 
Hoppers 2005). This kind of view leads directly to epistemological relativism and 
to relativism about truth, with all their attendant difficulties. Why is relativism prob-
lematic? Briefly, to be a relativist about knowledge is to maintain that there is no 
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objective knowledge of reality (or better: of realities) independently of cognisers 
or knowers from relevant social groups. The difficulty for relativists is to avoid the 
inconsistent claim that the relativistic thesis is itself an item of objective knowl-
edge. To be a relativist about truth is to maintain that there is no universal truth, that 
there is only a multitude of truths. Again, the difficulty for relativists is to avoid the 
inconsistent claim that the relativistic thesis is itself universally (translocally and 
transculturally) true. 
Relativism in science, in particular, is problematic in that one would not be able to 
compare and evaluate competing knowledge claims, theories and/ or hypotheses. Of 
course, many theorists would welcome this implication. Gilbert Onwu and Mogege 
Mosimege, for example, are worried about the ‘gate-keeping’ mechanisms set up 
by ‘Western’ science to determine ‘what is to be included or excluded as science’ 
(Onwu and Mosimege 2004, 4, 6, 11). If relativism were true, for the sake of the 
present argument, then there would be no epistemic or veritistic grounds for choosing 
between the claim that ‘rain is the result of evaporation and so on and so forth’ and 
the belief that ‘rain can arise at will as a result of human action’, that ‘the rain by-
passes the farm/ field of the person who stands while drinking the ploughing season’ 
(Onwu and Mosimege 2004, 7). Second, one would not be able to speak of scientific 
‘progress’, even within a particular society or culture. Most disturbingly, this kind of 
approach would thwart all scientific inquiry into, or curiosity about, phenomena for 
which there already exists a traditional, folkloric account or explanation.
On the present analysis, either ‘indigenous science’ refers to indigenous practices, 
skills or beliefs, whether or not these are ‘scientific’, or it is not characteristically or 
essentially ‘indigenous’. Without doubt, scientific practices, skills and beliefs vary 
across history and across cultures and societies. It also makes sense to say that hu-
man values and expectations have an important bearing on scientific practice or pro-
cedure. However, the consideration that science is not ‘value-free’ or ‘value-neutral’ 
has nothing to do with whether or not science is universal. Scientific knowledge 
and truth are not culturally specific, or relative to particular social circumstances or 
cultural contexts. While the ascription or attribution of scientific knowledge may 
vary according to personal, social or cultural context, scientific knowledge and truth 
as such do not so vary. It is this insight, and not adherence to a questionable idea, that 
has profound implications for higher education and tertiary curricula.
If something is referred to as ‘indigenous scientific knowledge’ in the sense of 
factual or declarative knowledge, it must meet the requisite criteria: belief, evidential 
adequacy and truth. If it does, it is relevantly similar and, indeed, equal to ‘non-
indigenous’ knowledge in a particular area or field. Thus, the traditional healer’s 
knowledge would be as significant, epistemologically, as that of a general medical 
practitioner, and the knowledge of a naturopath or homoeopath. The insights into 
climate change, animal behaviour and plant life cycles of a Bushman, Inuit or South 
American Indian would be no less important than those of occidental analysts, 
climatologists and biologists. In fact, both could arguably learn from each other. 
Malegapuru William Makgoba points out, in this regard, that
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[w]e have not brought traditional healers into the system. … If our Western doctors 
were to interact more with traditional healers, we might learn a lot, and we might be 
able to teach them too. The point is that without the participation of these people, 
we’ll never be able to institute the primary health care system we need. (Makgoba 
1997, 194, 195).
It is important to bear in mind that there is no question here of different truths (dif-
ferent kinds and appraisals of evidence perhaps, different beliefs almost certainly), 
no question of (radically) different knowledges. Truth and reality are essentially not 
in the eye of the beholder.
Livingstone Mqotsi succinctly explains the distinctions between fact and myth, 
science and superstition. He contends that ‘beliefs in witchcraft and sorcery’ have 
‘social and psychological functions … [T]hey regulate human relationships’ and also 
‘buttress the power of those in authority’. However, as ‘a manner of adapting to the 
environment’, these beliefs constitute ‘an ineffectual technique, for it arises from a 
failure to understand the true relationship between cause and effect, and assumes 
an understanding of that relationship based on magic’ (Mqotsi 2002, 168, 169). The 
kind of schism addressed by Mqotsi exists even in scientists like Makgoba who 
claims that his
paternal uncles and aunties are experts in the art of fortune-telling and assessing out-
come. They are in the old profession of traditional doctoring, popularly referred to as 
witch doctors. (Makgoba 1997, 1).
Makgoba nonetheless recognizes that 
[t]he laws of nature or science or for that matter scientific discoveries are not written 
in any particular language or culture, but transcend these. These discoveries are writ-
ten in the minds of men and women across these artificial divides, hence scientific 
principles are in general universal. (Makgoba 1997, 15).
Speaking about the fundamental role of the university, in a tape recording made in 
Princeton in 1951, Albert Einstein said: 
The institution of universities is based on the ideal of universality in its widest sense, 
universality of the domain of enquiry, striving for truth, unaffected by extraneous 
aims, intentions or prejudices. Striving for universality of the spirit, unrestrained 
by national or other political motivations. In short, what matters is the striving for 
universality of mind and spirit. It is no secret that we have been far more successful 
in developing the mind than in developing the personality. It seems that even the 
quest for knowledge is threatened by lack of persons of a truly universal spirit. If the 
universities remain true to their fundamental task, they may contribute significantly to 
the solution of the crises which threaten us today. (Einstein 2003, CD 2, track 7).
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What are the implications for (higher) education? Given Einstein’s compelling point 
about striving for truth and universality, which aspects of so-called ‘indigenous’, 
‘local’, ‘alternative’, ‘informal’ and – in our case – African scientific knowledge 
should be taught or included in the curriculum? Which should be left out? On what 
grounds? The question as to what should be left out is fairly easily answered. Not 
included in the curriculum, that is to say, not under the guise of ‘science’, should 
be mere beliefs or opinions unanchored by evidence and reason/s, bald assertions, 
superstitions, prejudice, bias – in fact anything that involves myth, fabrication and 
constitutes an infringement on the epistemic rights of students. For example, there 
is no place in biology classes for teaching ideas like creationism. However, it may 
be pedagogically and epistemically useful to teach these qua beliefs, opinions, asser-
tions, superstitions, prejudice and bias. 
The question as to which aspects of, say, African science should be included 
probably requires a more comprehensive response than I am able to provide here. 
Briefly, indigenous skills and practical knowledge are worthy of inclusion. More-
over, it follows from the account provided above that anything that meets the es-
sential requirements for theoretical knowledge could in principle be included, like 
traditional African knowledge of agriculture and environment. A sangoma’s insight 
into the palliative and curative properties of plants and herbs constitutes an insight 
that may not be shared by many, but it has translocal value and application. There is a 
staggering amount of common ground between cultures, not only in terms of factual 
knowledge but also in terms of values (contra the implication in Le Grange 2004a). 
A rapprochement between so-called ‘indigenous’ and ‘non-indigenous’ insights is 
not only possible but also desirable – on educational, political, as well as scientific 
grounds.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
I consider the present analysis of science and scientific knowledge to be not only 
plausible but also indispensable for clearing up some of the confusions in debates 
around indigenous science. In other words, this account of the character of science 
and scientific knowledge may be used as a yardstick. Thus, the onus will be on any-
one who is opposed to the analysis presented here to furnish an alternative and more 
feasible understanding, one that is sufficiently unambiguous and comprehensive to 
address the issues and problems raised here – including what constitutes science and 
distinguishes it from non-science.
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